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 According to the United Network for Organ Sharing, there are currently 75,899 active 
candidates who are waiting to receive an organ transplant.1 Twenty-two people, on average, die 
each day waiting for a transplant. These statistics demonstrate the large discrepancy between the 
demand for organs transplants and the amount of organs available to meet those demands. 
Instances of scarcity, such as this, inhibit healthcare providers’ ability to provide care to all of their 
patients. As a result, healthcare providers are forced to make decisions about patients’ eligibility 
and priority for receiving organ transplants to try to accommodate for the fact that it is not feasible 
for all patients to receive the care they need. Healthcare providers generally focus on the urgency 
of treatment and likelihood of successful transplants when considering eligibility for receiving 
transplants2. For example, the Lung Allocation Score Calculator, a tool utilized to “estimate each 
lung candidates’ urgency and expected post-transplant survival rate relative to other patients on 
the waiting list for a lung transplant”, considers two separate factors: “waitlist urgency” and “post-
transplant survival.” Respectively, these two factors are estimates of “the number of days a 
candidate is expected to live… if he or she does not receive a transplant” and “the number of days 
a candidate is expected to live… after receiving a lung transplant.”3 
 While these two factors dominate the discussion about eligibility for organ transplants, the 
large number of waitlisted patients has begun to initiate considerations of other factors when 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The United Network for Organ Sharing website has an updating tracker of the number of individuals who are 
currently active waiting list candidates. As of 12:34am on April 18th, 2017, the total consisted of 75,899 individuals. 
The link to this cite is: https://www.unos.org/data/.  
 
2 The U.S. Government Information on Organ Donation and Transplantation has comprehensive lists that are 
utilized for consideration in different organ transplants. This website can be accessed at the following link: 
https://organdonor.gov/about/process/matching.html. 
 
3 A version of the LAS calculator, can be found on the U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Services site: 





determining the eligibility of transplant recipients4. One of these factors is the patient’s lifestyle 
choices and how those choices can or will affect a patient’s health outcomes. This method of 
healthcare allocation is referred to as personal responsibility throughout the paper, and its focus is 
to prioritize patients based on whether their health outcomes were or could be affected by their 
own lifestyle choices.  
 The focus on unhealthy lifestyle choices is of growing importance in the medical field. In 
2014, the top-three causes of death in the United States were heart disease, cancer, and chronic 
lower respiratory diseases.5 The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) estimates that 
34%, 21%, and 39%, respectively, of the deaths from these causes were “potentially preventable” 
in nature.6 The preventable nature of these diseases is in large part due to people’s decisions to 
engage in unhealthy lifestyle choices which directly increase the risk of contracting these type of 
conditions.  
 The impact of unhealthy lifestyle choices is also substantial in patients who are actively 
waiting for organ transplants. For example, some of the individuals currently on the waitlist for 
liver transplants suffer from alcoholic liver disease (ALD). In these cases, considerations of 
personal responsibility would allow healthcare providers to prioritize patients based on the fact 
that their past behaviors did not cause their current health condition. This example demonstrates 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 For an example of how these programs have been implemented in the United States, see: 
 Steinbrook, R. (2006). Imposing Personal Responsibility for Health. N Engl J Med, 355, 753-756, 
 doi:10.1056/NEJMp068141 
 
5 See The Centers for Disease Control and Protection’s Health, United States, 2015 Table 19 p. 107. This data can 
be found online at the following website: https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/hus/hus15.pdf#019.  
 
6 A summary of the percentages and the reasons behind the “preventable” nature of the deaths can be found on the 
archived CDC cite “Up to 40 percent of annual deaths from each of five leading US casualties are preventable”. The 
site can be found at: https://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2014/p0501-preventable-deaths.html. Data collected 




how appealing to personal responsibility would empower healthcare providers to make distinctions 
between patients when considering eligibility for limited resources. I focus a large portion of this 
paper to determining whether these distinctions are beneficial to both healthcare providers and 
patients.  
 While appealing to personal responsibility to prioritize patients has the potential to produce 
beneficial outcomes, ultimately the implementation of personal responsibility ends up being quite 
complicated. Considerations about moral agency and the circumstances that affect behaviors can 
limit the ability of healthcare providers to convincingly argue that an individual is responsible for 
their lifestyle choices. These concerns significantly limit the ability of healthcare providers to 
justifiably distinguish cases based on different levels of personal responsibility.  
 The goal of this paper will be to argue that prioritization based on personal responsibility 
ensures a more net-positive outcome than conceptions of prioritization that ignore personal 
responsibility entirely. This paper will focus on instances of scarcity in order to discuss situations 
where all patients cannot receive their required treatments. To achieve this goal, I will start by 
distinguishing between different components of personal responsibility and how those components 
can lead to more or less beneficial outcomes. Once I have sufficiently discussed these distinctions 
at length, I will move on to consider whether prioritizations that ignore personal responsibility are 
capable of producing more positive outcomes that result from prioritizations that consider personal 
responsibility and whether distinction based on responsibility are justified in healthcare. I will then 
shift my attention to dealing with complications of responsibility, especially environmental and 
genetic factors that impact people’s ability to view someone as responsible for their actions. After 




regarding how these theories of prioritization should be implemented in modern healthcare 




I: The Two Components of Personal Responsibility  
 A survey of adults in the United States measured people’s preferences for allocating care 
in instances where patients are varyingly responsible for their poor health outcomes.7 One of the 
distributed survey questions involved two patients who were both in need of liver transplants; one 
of the individuals’ liver disease was caused by years of drinking alcohol while the other had liver 
disease as a result of an inherited factor. For the purpose of our discussion, the individual whose 
liver disease was caused by drinking will be referred to as Patient X and the individual whose liver 
disease was the result of an inherited factor will be referred to as Patient Y. The results of this 
survey found that those who responded were 10 to 17 times more likely to allocate liver transplants 
to Patient Y than Patient X.8 Wittenberg concluded that the results of this survey demonstrated a 
preference among respondents to the survey  to distinguish these cases based on whether a patient 
was personally responsible for their health conditions.  
 However, for the purpose of clarity, I wanted to determine whether people’s justifications 
for prioritizing Patient Y was actually based on Patient X’s blameworthiness for their illness.9 To 
do this, I created and distributed my own survey on a smaller scale that was focused on the 
prioritization of lung cancer treatments for patients with different smoking habits.10 As a way to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 See Wittenberg, E., Goldie S. J., Fischhoff, B., Graham, J. D. (2003) Rationing Decisions and Individual 
 Responsibility for Illness: Are All Lives Equal? Medical Decision Making, 23 (3), 194-211, 
 doi:10.1177/0272989X03253647.  
 
8 Id. 194  
 
9 See Id.. 200 for a list of respondents’ given justifications for favoring the patient with the inherited disease. Of 
these responses, the three most common were “Alcoholism is voluntary”, “Alcoholics are to blame/are responsible 
for their liver disease”, and “Alcoholics will keep on drinking.” 
 
10 This survey was distributed to twenty-three individuals of varying ages, 16-70 years old, and varying education 
levels, current high school students to graduate degrees. Results were collected online using a Google Form. A copy 





control for other variables, I implemented specific guidelines on the patients’ similarities and 
differences. Each question in the survey involved two patients who were identical twins that grow 
up in the same environment.11 Each patient’s ailment is said to be the same and the patient’s time-
frame for needing treatment is the same.12 The only distinguishing factor in these cases is the 
patients’ behaviors and how their actions or inactions have affected their health outcomes.13 
Knowing this, the respondents had to determine how care should be allocated and how certain they 
were in their responses.14  
 Advocates of personal responsibility tend to focus on the fact that patients’ past actions 
have impacted their health outcomes, which changes their priority of receiving care. However, I 
believe there is another component of personal responsibility: how future actions will impact 
health outcomes. Appealing to this component of personal responsibility, respondents could argue 
that Patient Y is also less likely to take up a future of excessive drinking. To test which component 
of personal responsibility is more influential on the prioritization of allocating care in these cases, 
I divided the negative behaviors associated with smoking into two distinct parts: the smoking that 
caused the lung cancer, and the likelihood that a patient will smoke after receiving treatment. The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 The reasoning behind this claim is that assuming similar genetic codes and environmental influences neutralizes 




12 The reasoning behind this claim is that it neutralizes the ability of the respondent to distinguish the patients based 
on the urgency or success rate of treating either patients’ condition. This might have had an impact on the 
respondents’ inclinations on allocating care based on the earlier discussion of eligibility for organ transplants. 
 
13 While this is not explicitly explained in the survey, all those who responded have been exposed to the scientific 
studies that have demonstrated a causal linkage between smoking and an increased risk of lung cancer. For an 
example of this study, see  
Khang, Y-H. (2015) The causality between smoking and lung cancer among groups and individuals: addressing 
 issues in tobacco litigation in South Korea. Epidemiology and Health, 37, doi:10.4178/epih/e2015026 
 
14 One of the options for determining allocation of care was “No preference (i.e. flip a coin to determine who gets 
treatment)”. This option was meant to measure if the respondent felt both patients were equally deserving, or 





backward-looking component of personal responsibility is a patients’ blameworthiness for their 
illnesses. In contrast, the forward-looking component of personal responsibility is a patients’ 
accountability for having healthy behaviors in the future.15 Using these distinctions, I developed 
three examples that would attempt to identify the respondents’ justification for prioritization: The 
Smoker vs. The Non-Smoker, The Smoker vs. The Smoker Who Quit, and The Smoker vs. The 
Changed Non-Smoker. I will elaborate on the results and conclusions of these examples in the 
following sections.  
1. Healthcare Allocation Survey 
1.1 Question 1: Smoker vs. Non-Smoker 
 In this first example, Patient A’s lifetime smoking habits have caused their lung cancer. 
Patient B has lung cancer from an uncontrollable cause and has never smoked before. Of the 
twenty-three respondents, 52% strongly preferred giving care to Patient B while 35% hesitantly 
preferred giving care to Patient B.16 13% said they had no preference in who received care, while 
none of the respondents felt Patient A should have their treatment prioritized.  
 The purpose of this example was to determine if prioritization of lung cancer treatments 
based on patients’ smoking habits would reflect the findings of Wittenberg’s survey. In this 
example, I make no stipulations about the patients’ future smoking habits.17 This was purposefully 
done so that respondents could potentially argue for prioritization from either a forward-looking 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 These accounts correspond to the “Alcoholics are to blame/are responsible for their liver disease” and “Alcoholics 
will keep on drinking” justifications in Wittenberg et al.’s survey, respectively. (See Note 9).  
 
16 For convenience, percentages were rounded to the nearest whole percent. A summary of all results are included in 
Appendix B.  
 





or backward-looking conception of personal responsibility.18 Determining what aspect was more 
important for respondents was the purpose of the next two examples.    
1.2 Question 2: Smoker vs. Smoker Who Quit 
 In this example, Patient A’s lifetime smoking habits has caused their lung cancer, and it 
was clearly stated that Patient A never quit smoking and will continue to smoke even after they 
receive treatments. Patient B’s lifetime smoking habits have also caused their lung cancer. 
However, Patient B quit smoking last year and will never smoke again. Of the twenty-three 
respondents, everyone felt that Patient B should be prioritized for treatments in this case, with 61% 
of respondents being strongly certain and 39% being hesitantly certain. 
 In the context of our accounts of backward-looking and forward-looking personal 
responsibility, this case is an example where the two patients are equally blameworthy for their 
lung cancer but have demonstrated different levels of accountability with regards to their post-
treatment behaviors. Therefore, the distinguishing factor between the two patients, and thus the 
factor that all respondents used as the basis for determining which patient should receive treatment, 
is accountability, or forward-looking personal responsibility. We can therefore conclude that 
everyone who responded to the survey viewed accountability for future actions as a justifiable way 
to prioritize Patient B. 
1.3 Question 3: Smoker vs. Changed Non-Smoker 
 In the final example, Patient A’s lifetime smoking habits has caused their lung cancer, and 
it was clearly stated that Patient A never quit smoking and will continue to smoke even after they 
receive treatments. However, Patient B has never smoked and has developed lung cancer from 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 To argue that the life-long smoker was justifiably prioritized lower than the non-smoker from a forward-looking 
account of personal responsibility, the respondents would have to appeal to a justification, similar to what is seen in 




uncontrollable causes. However, the stress of developing lung cancer will cause Patient B to start 
smoking after and during their lung cancer treatments. Of the twenty-three respondents, 26% were 
hesitantly certain that Patient B should be prioritized while 9% of those who responded felt 
hesitantly certain that Patient A should be prioritized. Meanwhile, 65.0% of respondents had no 
preference in determining which patient received care.  
 In the context of the accounts of backward-looking and forward-looking personal 
responsibility, this case is an example where the two patients are demonstrating an equal disregard 
for their accountability to engage in healthy post-treatment behaviors but have different levels of 
blameworthiness for their illnesses. Therefore, the distinguishing factor that is the basis for 
determining which patient should be prioritized is blameworthiness, or backward-looking 
responsibility.  
 The mixed results of the respondents for this example seem to demonstrate that 
blameworthiness might not be as appealing as Wittenberg concluded. In this example, if 
blameworthiness was the primary consideration, respondents would have prioritized Patient B 
since their lung cancer was not the result of their own actions. However, the fact that the majority 
of respondents felt that Patient B should not be prioritized demonstrates that blameworthiness is 
not a compelling reason to prioritize Patient B over Patient A when blameworthiness isolated from 
considerations of accountability.  
1.4 Results of the Survey 
 The purpose behind these thought experiments was to isolate the different justifications 
that people have for prioritizing who gets healthcare in instances of limited resources. In questions 
2 and 3 of the survey, both patients engaged in the same behaviors with regards to either forward 




patients engaged in unhealthy behaviors that made them blameworthy for their lung cancer, but 
the patients demonstrated different levels of accountability for their post-treatment behaviors. For 
The Smoker vs. The Changed Non-Smoker, both patients would have engaged in the same 
unhealthy post-treatment behaviors, but the patients had different levels of blameworthiness for 
their health outcomes. By holding different variables constant in these examples, I was able to 
isolate the stronger justification for prioritizing care: forward-looking personal responsibility.  
 In Wittenberg et al.’s survey, the blameworthiness justification for prioritizing Patient Y 
(“Alcoholics are to blame/are responsible for their liver disease”) was more common than the 
accountability justification (“Alcoholics will keep drinking”).19 This seems to contradict the results 
of the smoking thought experiments, which found that the accountability distinction led to a 
stronger preference for valuing healthy behaviors when determining healthcare prioritization. I 
believe that the disconnect between these surveys’ results is caused by a misconception people 
have about their justifications for prioritizing personal responsibility. The first example, The 
Smoker vs. The Non-Smoker, is intended to demonstrate how we prioritize healthcare allocation 
to patients based on their personal responsibility for poor health outcomes. The justification for 
making this distinction in prioritization of receiving care seems intuitively based on the 
blameworthiness aspect of these two individuals’ past decisions.20 However, the fact that the 
respondents’ opinions of this case more closely match the results of the accountability case, The 
Smoker vs. The Smoker Who Quit, and not the blameworthiness case, The Smoker vs. The 
Changed Non-Smoker, demonstrates that justifications are more likely based on an intrinsic, 
psychological connection that respondents make between blameworthiness for past actions and the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 See Wittenberg et al., 200 for a list of given justifications for favoring patient with inherited disease. 
 
20 This was the conclusion of Wittenberg et al.’s article as well as the most common response for justifying this 




likelihood of a lack of accountability for future actions. Once these two different forms of personal 
responsibility were separated from one another, it became clear that accountability was a stronger 
justification for prioritizing the non-smoker in the first example.  
2. Justifications for Favoring Accountability Over Blameworthiness 
 While the results of these experiments demonstrate a tendency of the respondents to favor 
accountability, these results are not sufficient to convince someone that accountability is a better 
account than blameworthiness for prioritizing healthcare allocation. In this section, I will argue for 
the superiority of accountability based on three factors: patient motivation, the physician-patient 
relationship, and increased likelihood of successful health outcomes.  Each will attempt to 
demonstrate why accountability-based prioritization leads to a more positive outcome than a 
blameworthiness-based method, and why the resulting positive outcomes are valuable for both 
healthcare providers and patients.  
2.1 Patient Motivation 
 One of the potential benefits of personal responsibility in general is that it will dissuade 
individuals from engaging in unhealthy behaviors.  Personal responsibility involves punishing 
individuals whose behaviors negatively impact their health, and enforcing this type of punishment 
could instill a societal wide incentive to engage in healthier behaviors. However, the ways in which 
backward-looking and forward-looking personal responsibility successfully motivate patients to 
engage in healthier behaviors is quite different. By distinguishing the results of these two models, 
I will attempt to demonstrate why the motivation to be accountable for future behaviors leads to 
healthier patients than the motivation to not be blameworthy.  
 When considering the impacts of a backward-looking personal responsibility based 




patients based on blameworthiness would motivate people to engage in healthier behaviors. By 
implementing regulations that allowed healthcare providers to prioritize patients who are less 
blameworthy for their behavior, patients would be further incentivized to engage in behaviors that 
ensured they were not blameworthy for their poor health outcomes. For example, if healthcare 
providers in the United States implemented a rule that all liver transplant recipients could not have 
drank alcohol at any point in their life, the intuition is that less people would drink alcohol to 
ensure that they are eligible for a potential liver transplant if they need one in the long-run. As a 
result, advocates for blameworthiness in personal responsibility could argue that such regulations 
would motivate people to engage in healthier behavior.  
 However, a problem that arises from this depiction of personal responsibility as 
blameworthiness is that such regulations offer no method of motivation for individuals who have 
already engaged in unhealthy behaviors.21 Consider The Smoker vs. The Smoker Who Quit 
example. Implementing regulations that focus on blameworthiness cannot motivate the life-long 
smoker, Patient A, to quit smoking. This conception of personal responsibility has already 
determined that Patient A is blameworthy for their lung cancer, and as a result, it offers no way for 
Patient A to redeem his lost priority for receiving lung cancer treatments.  
 This is where accountability demonstrates its superiority to blameworthiness as a method 
of motivation. If we continue focusing on The Smoker vs. The Smoker Who Quit, accountability 
based personal responsibility prioritizes patients based on the likelihood that they will engage in 
unhealthy behaviors in the future. This offers an incentive for Patient A to quit smoking in the 
hopes that healthcare providers would be assured that their behaviors will not remain unhealthy 
after receiving treatments.  This emphasis on future actions instills a constant motivating factor 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Engaging in unhealthy behaviors can stem from both past indifferences to the backward-looking regulations or 




that engaging in healthy behaviors will result in higher prioritization of healthcare resources, even 
if past unhealthy lifestyle choices have led to poor health outcomes. 
 A potential objection to accountability based prioritizations is that its forgivingness toward 
individuals who engage in unhealthy behaviors would sufficiently dissuade people from engaging 
in such behaviors. However, this objection can be refuted by considering how forward-looking 
personal responsibility would calculate the likelihood that an individual will engage in healthy 
behaviors in the future. In a model based on accountability, the primary concern for healthcare 
providers would be the likelihood that a patient engages in healthy behaviors post-treatment. For 
example, if a patient with a history of smoking needs lung cancer treatments, the healthcare 
provider can prioritize the eligibility of this patient based on how likely it is that the patient changes 
their behavior and quits smoking. However, the fact that the patient is currently smoking increases 
the expected likelihood that the patient will continue smoking in the future. In this way, 
accountability motivates unhealthy patients to engage in healthier behaviors. It also motivates 
healthy individuals to maintain their habits so that healthcare providers are less inclined to doubt 
that the patient will engage in healthy post-treatment behaviors. Therefore, accountability can 
motivate both individuals who have never smoked and life-time smokers to not smoke, a feature 
that makes it distinct from the methods of motivation gained by pursuing blameworthiness.  
 Implementing accountability based healthcare prioritization results in encouraging patients 
to engage in healthier behavior and rewarding them for their healthy behavior through a higher 




be an intrinsically and instrumentally beneficial outcome.22 For healthcare providers, the increased 
capacity to motivate healthy behaviors would lead to higher rates of compliance among patients.  
2.2 Physician-Patient Relationship 
 Another potential impact of personal responsibility based prioritization is that it can have 
an effect on the relationship between healthcare providers (especially physicians and nurses) and 
patients. Research shows that when physicians and patients have a trusting relationship, healthcare 
costs are lowered and patient satisfaction is increased.23 (Rosser 2001) The trust between patients 
and healthcare providers can deteriorate if the patient feels the need to lie to their healthcare 
provider about their own behaviors. This is a potential consequence of personal responsibility. If 
patients know that physicians consider blameworthiness when prioritizing treatments, the patient 
could be motivated to lie to the physician to receive higher levels of prioritization. As a result of 
patients lying, physicians will receive inaccurate accounts of their patients’ medical information. 
This will make prescribing correct treatments more difficult, resulting in worse outcomes for the 
patient.  
 Another aspect of this break in trust between physicians and patients is that patients’ sense 
of self-worth can be diminished. In Jacobson’s Dignity & Health, there are testimonies of patients 
feeling “diminished” when they cannot be themselves and must lie to physicians in order to get 
their desired treatments. 24If patients know that physicians are prioritizing them based on unhealthy 
behaviors, interactions with doctors could begin to feel like interrogations. When patients are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 An example of these benefits could be described by the increased quality of life by being healthier (intrinsic) and 
the increased opportunities to pursue other interests as a result of not having to deal with as many crippling 
conditions (instrumental).  
 
23 See Rosser, W. W. (2001) The Benefits of a Trusting Physician-Patient Relationship, J Fam Pract., 50 (4),  
 329-330. 
 





forced to lie to physicians about their health behaviors, they are reminded of their inability to quit 
their unhealthy behaviors, reinforcing feelings of despair and helplessness.25 These interactions 
can increase stress levels, which can correlate to a stronger tendency to indulge unhealthy habits. 
In this way, backward-looking personal responsibility can put unhealthy, counterproductive levels 
of stress on patients while also damaging a physician’s ability to have a trusting relationship with 
patients.  
 However, accountability methods of prioritization do a much better job of empowering 
patients to be open about their behaviors. As described in the prior section, forward-looking 
responsibility focuses on a patients’ capacity to be healthier in the future, not their tendency to 
have engaged in unhealthy behaviors in the past. The focus on accountability encourages people 
who are serious about changing their behaviors to talk to their physicians candidly about their 
behaviors so that they can get the necessary resources. This will improve health outcomes, since 
physicians will be better informed about their patients’ behaviors and can utilize this information 
to help the patients change their behaviors if needed. In addition, focusing on future outcomes will 
reinforce the idea that physicians are there to help patients be as healthy as possible. As a result, 
the trust between physicians and patients will be strengthened. As I have already discussed, this 
will have a positive impact on patient and healthcare provider satisfaction.  
2.3 Likelihood of Successful Health Outcomes Post-Treatment 
 Perhaps the most important way that forward-looking and backward-looking personal 
responsibility differ is the way that accountability considerations lead to a higher frequency of 
successful health outcomes. Backward-looking personal responsibility does not allow healthcare 
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providers to distinguish cases based on how patients will act post-treatment. As demonstrated in 
The Smoker vs. The Smoker Who Quit, this distinction can have a large impact on how we 
intuitively view prioritization in these cases, but it also directly affects the outcomes of patients. 
Failing to consider the behaviors that occur post-treatment results in ignoring the likelihood of 
future complications. Forward-looking responsibility, in contrast, focuses on future actions. This 
results in better measurements of how successful a treatment will be based on the patients’ 
willingness to engage in healthy post-treatment behaviors. This will be beneficial for healthcare 
providers because they can make sure that their limited resources are being utilized on cases with 
a higher probability of success. It will also be better for patients because of the improved health 
outcomes that result from the emphasis on post-treatment behaviors.  
 At this point, I would like to acknowledge a potentially troubling distinction between 
forward and backward-looking personal responsibility. Given the focus of accountability for future 
actions, forward-looking personal responsibility is basing its prioritization of care on factors that 
are inevitably uncertain in nature. There is no method of determining with one-hundred percent 
accuracy what a patient will do after receiving treatments. In contrast, there are ways to determine 
what a person has done in the past. This could be problematic for both healthcare providers and 
patients. Healthcare providers could be frustrated by the difficulty of determining what actions a 
patient will do in the future and potentially dislike having the responsibility of making judgments 
of a patients’ character and willingness to engage in healthy post-treatment behaviors. For patients, 
being told that prioritization of precious resources can be determined by the perceived likelihood 
of engaging in future behaviors would seem arbitrary and unfair.  
 A way to deal with this concern is to bring up the distinction between accountability and 




investment bankers, it seems most beneficial for them to prioritize loan recipients based on the 
perception that they will be a good investment going forward. While this perception is based on 
an uncertainty, it can be informed by different factors, such as the past behavior of this loan 
recipient and whether they have paid back their loans on time before. If we consider the distribution 
of loans as a metaphor for providing care, it seems that we have an adept way to argue that 
accountability concerns should be of greater importance to healthcare providers. Ensuring that 
their resources are utilized on cases with high likelihoods of success is important, especially given 
that there is a scarcity of the provided resources. Prioritizing patients based on accountability for 
future actions allows healthcare providers to ensure that their limited resources are given to patients 
who will have the highest likelihood of successful outcomes.  
 There is another implication of this line of thought. Forward-looking personal 
responsibility is focused on the likelihood of successful outcomes. As a result, accountability 
should consider all post-treatment behaviors that affect the likelihood of successful outcomes. 
Therefore, even actions that could not be blameworthy for the specific health condition are worthy 
of consideration in forward-looking personal responsibility. For example, consider an individual 
who smokes who broke their arm. One account of forward-looking responsibility would argue that 
prioritization of this person’s treatment would be based on the likelihood of them engaging in 
activities that put them at risk to break their arm again.26 In this way, forward-looking personal 
responsibility increases the likelihood that the patient heals properly and does not break their arm 
again. However, another factor that influences bone healing is tobacco usage. Therefore, forward-
looking personal responsibility should also prioritize the allocation of casts based on the patients’ 
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willingness to change all behaviors that impact health outcomes, not just the actions that caused 
the health condition in the first place.27 
3. Objections Based on the Arbitrariness of Time in Determining Personal Responsibility 
 Before moving forward with this conception of forward-looking personal responsibility, it 
is important to consider a potentially damaging objection about the nature of distinguishing actions 
that occurred in the past and those that will occur in the future. A distinguishing factor between 
forward and backward-looking personal responsibility is the type of actions that are considered 
relevant to prioritizing healthcare allocation. In one example it is whether or not the patient has 
smoked and in the other it is whether or not the patient will smoke. This seems counterintuitive to 
certain views of responsibility, since the action is the same in both instances.28 The only thing that 
is different is the time of the action occurring relative to the allocation of care. As Albertsen puts 
it, this distinction between forward and backward-looking personal responsibility results in a 
depiction of responsibility that “passes vastly different judgments on identical situations.”  
 However, I argue that Albertsen’s critique of Feiring does not transfer to my conception of 
forward-looking personal responsibility. Feiring’s conception of forward-looking responsibility 
depends, in large part, upon the claim that past actions should in no way impact our prioritization 
of care.29 (Feiring 2008) I do not believe that this claim is justified. My conception of forward-
looking personal responsibility is based on the perceived likelihood of engaging in healthy 
outcomes in the future. The calculation of this potential likelihood should and would be influenced 
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by a patients’ past behaviors, especially if the patient has a history of breaking promises about 
their future behaviors.  
 To demonstrate the feasibility of this argument, let us consider a liver transplant candidate. 
This person has a history of alcoholism that directly led to their need for receiving a liver 
transplant. The healthcare providers responsible for determining prioritization in this example have 
determined that the patient is a good candidate for a liver transplant given their recent enrollment 
in Alcoholics Anonymous and their seriousness about becoming sober. However, one year after 
the transplant, the patient begins to experience liver complications. The healthcare provider 
discovers that these are the result of more alcoholic drinking, as the patient stopped being sober 
only weeks after receiving their transplant. This patient should now be considered lower priority 
than before because they have demonstrated a willingness to break promises about future behaviors 
and this increases the perceived likelihood that this behavior will repeat itself. In this way, both 
past and future behaviors can influence the perceived likelihood of engaging in healthy post-
treatment behaviors. Therefore, there is no arbitrary distinction between actions based on time 
since all behaviors are considered in the context of how behaviors affect the likelihood that the 
patient will be healthy going forward.  
4. Conclusion 
 At the beginning of this chapter, I set out to distinguish between two different components 
of personal responsibility and determine which one was better suited for considering priority of 
patients in allocation of limited healthcare resources. By distributing my own survey, I 
demonstrated that blameworthiness was not the strongest justification for prioritization based on 
personal responsibility. I then set out to argue normatively why the consequences that resulted 




healthcare providers than a backward-looking personal responsibility model. In conclusion, I have 
demonstrated that appeals to personal responsibility as a method of prioritization should focus on 





II:  Justifications for Prioritizing Healthcare Allocation 
 Now that I have demonstrated the benefits of implementing forward-looking personal 
responsibility, I will attempt to determine whether implementing these principles is compatible 
with our conceptions of health needs, healthcare, and healthcare providers. Specifically, I will 
address arguments that believe that personal responsibility violates the human right to healthcare. 
30 In addition, I will discuss Elizabeth Anderson’s “goals of egalitarianism” and how forward-
looking personal responsibility does or does not meet these goals.31 Overall, the justification for 
forward-looking personal responsibility will rely on accounts of just prioritizations of healthcare, 
especially as they are described in Daniels’ Just Health.32  
1. Human Right to Healthcare 
 For a definition of the human right to healthcare, I will use the definition provided by 
Yvonne Denier. According to Denier, “there is a collective [stringent] moral obligation to ensure 
that everyone has access to some level of healthcare services…and access to healthcare is owed to 
those who have that right…because they are human.”33  Proponents of this definition of healthcare 
generally argue against healthcare access being contingent on other factors, such as a patients’ 
accountability for future actions. One advocate for the human right to healthcare who is strictly 
opposed to personal responsibility is Lasse Nielsen. I will analyze and attempt to refute his 
conclusions in the next section.  
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1.1 Lasse Nielsen’s Account of Healthcare 
 According to Lasse Nielsen, considerations of personal responsibility are not justifiable 
since healthcare is a basic human entitlement.34 As such, healthcare providers cannot take away a 
person’s  right to healthcare since it is guaranteed to them based on their intrinsic value as humans, 
not based on whether they deserve receiving treatments. Nielsen acknowledges that this guarantee 
means that responsibility should not be considered even in cases where all other factors are equal. 
In other words, Nielsen would have selected “No Preference” for all of the questions on the Health 
Allocation Survey since his conception of healthcare is that it should not be contingent on 
responsibility-based factors.  
 However, a pitfall of this line of thought is that there are already factors that affect 
prioritization of receiving care, specifically urgency of care and the likelihood of successful 
outcomes. Nielsen spends a large portion of this paper discussing considerations of urgency. 
Specifically, he argues that models of healthcare allocation should be able to prioritize patients 
base on the urgency of their treatments.35 Therefore, Nielsen would have to agree that urgency is 
a reasonable justification for prioritization of healthcare. Once this has been established, the 
question is not whether people can have their right to healthcare prioritized higher or lower than 
other people, it is whether forward-looking personal responsibility qualifies as a reasonable 
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1.2 Nielsen and Scarcity 
 At this point, it could be useful to consider a key distinction between inequalities in health 
and inequalities in healthcare.36 (Albertson & Knight 2015) As defined by Albertson and Knight, 
health inequalities are concerned with how health outcomes are distributed whereas healthcare 
inequalities are concerned with how healthcare access is distributed. Nielsen’s claim that 
healthcare access is a basic human right is primarily focused on inequalities in healthcare access. 
The justification for focusing on healthcare access seems to be based on the relatively greater 
control societies can have over the distribution of healthcare as compared to the distribution of 
health outcomes. In most instances, this is an accurate assessment. However, in the instances of 
scarcity that have been discussed thus far, societies cannot guarantee equal access to healthcare 
since healthcare resources are limited. This allows for consequentialist considerations to be utilized 
as a way of prioritizing different patients. As such, the positive outcomes that result from forward-
looking personal responsibility can justify distinguishing between patients where all other factors 
are equal.37 In this way, forward-looking responsibility is more beneficial to the society’s health 
needs than not distinguishing between the patients, as Nielsen advocates. This demonstrates that 
focusing on healthcare access, the primary concern of healthcare as a basic human right, does not 
lead to the positive outcomes that result from considerations of forward-looking personal 
responsibility in healthcare prioritization.  
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2. Anderson’s Democratic Equality 
 Luck egalitarianism is a theory of justice that focuses on the unequal distribution of ‘bad 
luck’.38 Luck egalitarianism focuses extensively on people’s responsibilities for the inequalities 
they experience. These are said to be inequalities that arise from personal responsibility, and are 
allowed in this system of egalitarian justice. Given the emphasis on personal responsibility, it is 
likely that the forward-looking personal responsibility model would be associated with luck 
egalitarianism. In order to avoid the pitfalls of luck egalitarianism, it is important to distinguish 
between the failures of luck egalitarianism and why these objections do or do not apply tot the 
forward-looking personal responsibility model.  
 In What is the Point of Equality?, Elizabeth Anderson argues that luck egalitarianism fails 
to accomplish the two primary goals of egalitarian justice: to ensure the absence of oppression and 
create a society in which all members are viewed as equals.39 She then argues for her own form of 
egalitarian justice, called “Democratic equality”, that ensures that the two primary goals of 
egalitarian justice are met.  
 I will consider what the goals of egalitarian justice guarantee in instances of healthcare 
prioritization. According to Anderson, egalitarian justice, when applied to healthcare 
prioritization, should ensure that patients are empowered to be viewed as equals. What does this 
equality guarantee? Given the inevitable condition that some patients will not receive treatment, 
this equality cannot guarantee equal access to care. However, it can guarantee that all patients have 
a right to be considered equally. At first glance, this guarantee could advocate for a form of 
prioritization that would respond “No preference” to all the questions in the Healthcare Allocation 
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Survey. However, considering “patients equally” implies that the judgments for prioritization are 
based on criteria that apply equally to all patients. At this point, I will analyze the objections that 
Anderson raises against luck egalitarianism to determine if similar objections can be said to apply 
to forward-looking personal responsibility.  
2.1 Anderson’s Problems with Luck Egalitarianism 
 Andersons argues that there are three ways that luck egalitarianism fails to realize the two 
primary goals of egalitarian justice. The first objection is that luck egalitarianism “excludes some 
citizens from enjoying the social conditions of freedom on the spurious ground that it’s their fault 
for losing them.”40 This objection is quite relevant to the backward-looking model of personal 
responsibility in healthcare.41 However, an appealing feature of forward-looking personal 
responsibility is that no patients are ever excluded from consideration. The basis of forward-
looking personal responsibility, the likelihood of patients engaging in healthy post-treatment 
behaviors, never justifies excluding an individual from considerations of accessing resources. In 
this way, the social conditions of freedom are not taken away from any patients. While patients 
can be prioritized according to their accountability for post-treatment actions, there is no basis for 
excluding patients from consideration for accessing healthcare.  
 The second objection is that luck egalitarianism “makes the basis for citizens’ claims…the 
fact that some are inferior to others in the worth of their lives.”47 Since the basis of luck 
egalitarianism is implementing reparations for victims of “bad luck”, it makes sense why Anderson 
makes this objection for luck egalitarianism. However, I argue that this objection does not apply 
to forward-looking personal responsibility. The basis for citizens’ claims in forward-looking 
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personal responsibility is not redistributing goods from the lucky to the unfortunate. The basis of 
claims in forward-looking personal responsibility is the right to be prioritized based on a 
demonstrated willingness to engage in healthy post-treatment behaviors. However, these claims to 
prioritization are claims to be prioritized over those who will not engage in healthy post-treatment 
behaviors. This could be said to be based on the superiority of individuals, a serious problem for 
Anderson’s goals of egalitarian justice. However, Anderson acknowledges that Democratic 
equality promotes individual responsibility by requiring that “Individuals still have to exercise 
responsible agency to achieve most of the functionings effective access to which society 
guarantees.”42 In this way, egalitarian justice allows for societal guarantees to be “conditioned on 
responsible performance of one’s duties.” Therefore, forward-looking personal responsibility does 
not break the requirements of egalitarian justice in this sense.  
 Anderson’s final objection to luck egalitarianism is that the model, “in attempting to ensure 
that people take responsibility for their choices, makes demeaning and intrusive judgments of 
people’s capacities to exercise responsibility and effectively dictates to them the appropriate uses 
of their freedom.”47 This seems to be the most damaging objection for forward-looking personal 
responsibility. The basis of valuing post-treatment behaviors seems to qualify as regulating the 
appropriate use of patients’ freedom. The way to counter this objection by Anderson is to claim 
that since healthcare prioritization concerns a limited, public good, there can be certain conditions 
of the reception of treatments. In this way, healthcare providers are entitled to implement 
conditional requirements for receiving limited resources using a similar justification that was 
utilized for Anderson’s second objection to luck egalitarianism. In this way, denying access to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




certain societal guarantees is justified in instances where individuals do not fulfill performance of 
their duties. 
 While it is difficult to determine if forward-looking personal responsibility is unaffected 
by Anderson’s objections to luck egalitarianism, it is true that the forward-looking personal 
responsibility model of healthcare prioritization is better than luck egalitarianism at ensuring the 
goals of egalitarian justice. As such, forward-looking personal responsibility can be said to value 
viewing all patients as equals.  
2.2 Prioritization and The Abandonment Problem 
 Another interesting objection Anderson has against luck egalitarianism is its “problem of 
abandonment of negligent victims.”43 At this point, I will attempt to apply this example to a model 
of forward-looking personal responsibility. From this example, it will be determined if the 
“abandonment example” demonstrates a flaw in forward-looking personal responsibility.  
 I will create an example, called the pseudo-abandonment example, that demonstrates how 
the “abandonment of negligent victims” is applied to considerations of post-treatment behaviors. 
In this hypothetical scenario, a reckless driver has gotten into a life-threatening accident. Upon 
arrival in the hospital, the healthcare providers are presented a note that was written by the reckless 
driver. It professes the driver’s intention to continue getting into accidents even if they fully 
recover from the hospitals’ treatments. In this case, forward-looking personal responsibility would 
advocate for abandoning the reckless driver based on the fact that they will not engage in healthy 
post-treatment behaviors. It will be granted that this is a bad outcome, since abandonment of 
patients seems unethical provided that it is possible to provide treatments.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




 However, a condition that has been articulated throughout this paper is that forward-
looking personal responsibility is intended to help with healthcare prioritization, not determine 
allocation on a broader scale. For the pseudo-abandonment example to apply to forward-looking 
personal responsibility, there must be another driver that has a higher likelihood of engaging in 
safe post-treatment behaviors AND it must be impossible to save both this driver and the reckless 
driver. In this situation, forward-looking personal responsibility would advocate for prioritizing 
the second driver receiving treatment. At this point, however, I wonder if Anderson would still 
consider this a problem? These instances of prioritization necessarily require that a patient would 
be abandoned. Forward-looking personal responsibility allows healthcare providers to prioritize 
the second patient; it does not allow healthcare providers to abandon the reckless driver when they 
are capable of saving both drivers.  
3. Norman Daniels’ Account of Health 
  At this point I would like to dedicate some thought to Norman Daniels’ Just Health. 
Daniels does extensive work that is beneficial to the argument in favor of forward-looking personal 
responsibility. In his book, Daniels considers three main Focal Questions: “Is health, and therefore 
health care and other factors that affect health, of special moral importance?”, “When are health 
inequalities unjust?”, and “How can we meet health needs fairly under resource constraints?”44 Of 
these three questions, the first and third will be the primary focus of this discussion. After 
explaining the basis of Daniels’ claims, I will attempt to demonstrate how each argument fits into 
the context of this discussion on forward-looking personal responsibility.  
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





3.1 Moral Importance of Health 
 To begin his discussion on the importance of health, Daniels lays out a detailed definition 
of health needs as “things we need in order to maintain, restore, or provide function equivalents to 
(where possible) normal species functioning.”45 This list of health needs includes: adequate 
nutrition, sanitary and safe living and work conditions, exercise rest and such important lifestyle 
choices,  preventative curative restorative and compensatory medical services, nonmedical 
personal and social support services, and an appropriate distribution of other social determinants 
of health. The importance of these services relies on the “normal species functioning” aspect of 
Daniels’ argument.  
 According to Daniels, the justification for the special moral importance of health and 
normal species functioning can be separated into intrinsic and instrumental considerations. Daniels 
acknowledges that being able to function properly and being healthy promote happiness and reduce 
suffering, which could conclusively argue for the importance of health from a utilitarian 
perspective.46 However, Daniels believes that the more compelling justification for the special 
moral importance of health stems from the instrumental benefits that health promotes, the same 
benefits that are lost when someone does not have their health needs met. Daniels argues that 
impairments to our health inhibit our ability to exercise our freedom of opportunity, which is a key 
trait of “normal species functioning.”  
 Daniels then connects the normal species functioning and freedom of opportunity to 
various accounts of justice, especially Rawls’ conception of “justice as fairness”, that emphasize 
the importance of the freedom of opportunities. As a result, Daniels normatively argues that 
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accounts of justice that value freedom of opportunity must also value the special moral importance 
of health needs given the causative relation between having health needs met and being able to 
exercise freedom of opportunity.  
 “In the name of freedom of opportunity, society should continue to be forward-looking, 
both in providing incentives to avoid hazardous behavior and in offering medical help.”47 From 
Daniels’ conception of the importance of health, as well as Denier’s quote about the importance 
of freedom of opportunity, I will reiterate the legitimacy of basing prioritizations on forward-
looking personal responsibility. Daniels’ account on the moral importance of health is primarily 
focused on the future opportunities that can be lost as a result of not having health needs met. This 
emphasis on healthcare as a way to guarantee future opportunities seems to parallel the emphasis 
of forward-looking personal responsibility on the likelihood of patients engaging in healthy post-
treatment behaviors. If we are to believe Daniels and claim that meeting health needs is of special 
moral importance as a result of the instrumental increase in freedom of opportunity, then meeting 
the health needs of individuals who choose to discard their freedom of opportunity (by engaging 
in unhealthy post-treatment behaviors) might not qualify as a morally important obligation. 
Therefore, prioritizing allocation of healthcare resources based on the increase in the respective 
patient’s freedom of opportunity seems perfectly in line with Daniels’ conception of health. As 
such, it seems justifiable for healthcare providers to prioritize patients based on forward-looking 
personal responsibility.  
3.2 Accountability for Reasonableness 
 To answer his third focal question, Daniels focuses primarily on the conditions that 
healthcare providers and other legitimate regulators of healthcare allocations must follow. These 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




conditions guarantee that there is a fair process to deal with limit setting and scarcity. Daniels 
begins the discussion by considering the difficulty of determining universal guidelines that are 
preferable in all instances. Specifically, Daniels discusses the conflicts between treating the worst 
off and treating those whose treatments result in the greatest net health benefit per dollar spent. 
Arguments in favor of these two positions in different circumstances demonstrate a central part of 
Daniels argument: that guidelines that are utilized to determine distribution of care in instances of 
scarcity and limit setting are based on “value judgments about which reasonable people can 
disagree.”48  
 Since Daniels acknowledges the controversial nature of these distinctions, he sets out to 
define certain conditions that must be met by morally legitimate entities, such as healthcare 
providers, in order to ensure that distinctions are the result of a fair processes. These conditions 
are listed as follows: the Publicity Condition, the Relevance Condition, the Revision and Appeals 
Condition, and the Regulative Condition.49  
 Explicit requirements for meeting all these conditions are defined in Daniels’ book. 
However, I will focus my discussion primarily on The Relevance Condition. A shared trait of The 
Publicity, Revision and Appeals, and Regulative Conditions is that they all focus on the 
implementation of prioritization measures, specifically how the general populace is informed and 
can influence these distinctions. For our conception of forward-looking personal responsibility, it 
can be assumed that all of these conditions can be met by considering the conditions and 
implementing regulations in accordance with these conditions. However, the importance of the 
Relevance Condition is that if forward-looking personal responsibility does not meet the 
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requirements of this condition, it is not salvageable as a fair process according to Daniels. With 
this assumption, I will explain the requirements of meeting the Relevance Condition and determine 
whether or not the conception of forward-looking personal responsibility meets these 
requirements.  
3.3 The Relevance Condition 
 In Daniels’ assessment of the Relevance Condition, he determines that “limit setting 
decisions should aim to provide a reasonable explanation of how the organization seeks to provide 
‘value for money’ in meeting the varied health needs…under reasonable constraints”50 In his more 
in depth evaluation, Daniels emphasizes that reasons are relevant when they focus on the “public 
good” that is pursued by all medical professionals involved in the distribution of care. However, 
at this point Daniels makes an interesting distinction that demonstrates the potential role of 
forward-looking personal responsibility. According to Daniels, this public good is not only 
affirmed by the healthcare professionals and providers, it is “avowed by patients seeking care who 
also want a cooperative scheme that provides affordable, nonwasteful care.”51 The implications of 
this claim seems to be that relevant conditions for managing limit settings and scarcity involve 
both healthcare providers and patients valuing the public good of promoting good health outcomes.  
 While Daniels does not explicitly argue for or against responsibility based accounts of 
health prioritization, it seems that his position on patient responsibility would consider forward-
looking personal responsibility relevant to the patients’ desires to ensure that healthcare benefits 
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are “nonwasteful.” This, combined with his ‘value for money’ distinction, seem to imply that 
forward-looking personal responsibility regulations would meet the Relevance Condition.52 
4. Conclusion 
 This chapter has examined different accounts of healthcare and health in the hopes of 
justifying the implementation of forward-looking personal responsibility. Nielsen, Anderson, and 
Daniels’ different accounts were used to determine if forward-looking personal responsibility 
conflicts with varying conceptions of healthcare access. As a result, it was confirmed that forward-
looking personal responsibility could be instituted as a fair process for distinguishing the cases we 
discussed in chapter I. Going forward, it will now be important to determine what factors limit the 
large-scale implementation of forward-looking personal responsibility as well as deal with other 
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III. Limitations for Forward-Looking Personal Responsibility 
 At this point in the paper, I will attempt to address the arguments that have been levied 
against personal responsibility models in healthcare prioritization.53 (Brown 2013) Since a 
substantial portion of the arguments that I will address in this chapter were primarily focused on 
the backward-looking conception of personal responsibility, I will attempt to demonstrate whether 
or not these criticisms are relevant to the discussion of forward-looking responsibility in addition 
to determining how to best respond to these criticisms. At the end of this chapter, the goal is to 
have a more accurate conception of how the limitations of forward-looking personal responsibility 
impact the implementation of these principles in non-ideal conditions.  
1. Circumstances and Autonomy 
 An intrusive problem with both backward and forward-looking personal responsibility is 
that the nature of behaviors makes it difficult to determine an individual’s autonomy over their 
lifestyle choices. Extensive sociological research has demonstrated that health outcomes and 
health behaviors can be negatively impacted by factors that are outside of an individuals’ control: 
such as environmental factors, genetics, and other forms of social inequality.54 As a result, it 
becomes difficult to separate these factors from an individual’s behavior in order to determine how 
much a person should be considered responsible for their actions.55  
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eventually result in a quantifiable way to measure how much a person is responsible for their actions.  
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 In Lifestyle, Responsibility, and Justice, Feiring argues that one of the benefits of a forward-
looking model of personal responsibility is that it does not succumb to the the same complicated 
distinctions between circumstances and voluntary actions.56 According to Feiring, since forward-
looking personal responsibility is focusing on future behaviors, it is operating under the 
assumption that the patient is an autonomous being that has the capacity to engage in the expected 
healthy behaviors. However, I do not believe that Feiring’s claim about forward-looking 
responsibility is accurate. There does not seem to be a relevant difference between the same action 
that occurs at two different times relative to the present. If a man smoking a cigarette five-years-
ago is a complicated action in which the effects of his voluntary choice cannot be separated from 
his circumstances, then I see no reason to believe that his smoking post-treatment can distinctly be 
traced to his voluntary autonomy, as Feiring suggests. Therefore, if healthcare providers cannot 
reasonably distinguish between the circumstances and voluntary motivations in past actions, it 
would be unreasonable to assume that they could do so for future ones. Given the emphasis of 
personal responsibility taking into account factors that are in a person’s control57, these 
circumstances that impair our ability to trace voluntary autonomy cast doubt over the primary 
principle of personal responsibility. As a result, advocates of forward-looking responsibility must 
accommodate for the complicated impacts of circumstances on patient behaviors in their model. 
A thorough explanation on how different factors can influence behaviors will be the focus of the 
next few sections. I will then attempt to salvage forward-looking personal responsibility so that it 
can deal with these complications.  
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1.1 Environmental Influences on Behaviors 
 This past summer, I did a volunteer internship at a non-profit organization in inner-city 
Baltimore. As a part of this program, I got to take a city-wide bus tour to learn about Baltimore 
and how different social determinants of health affected patient outcomes. As I toured the city of 
Baltimore, one of the most noticeable features was that over the course of the entire bus tour, I did 
not see a single grocery store. The only sources of food I could find were corner drug stores and 
fast-food restaurants. As I sat on the bus driving through the city, I wondered to myself, “Where 
do these people get their fruits and vegetables?” 
 It is conditions like this that demonstrate the importance of environmental considerations 
on a patients’ lifestyle choices. If patients’ in this environment were prioritized based on their 
likelihood of engaging in healthy eating habits, healthcare providers would have to lower these 
patients’ priority based on the inability of these patients to improve their eating habits since healthy 
foods are not available to them. The justifications of forward-looking personal responsibility 
included motivating patients and strengthening the physician-patient relationship. It can be 
demonstrated that these types of limitations on healthy patient behavior would severely damage 
the positive impacts of forward-looking personal responsibility.58 Patients are likely to be 
unmotivated and feel resentful toward their physicians if they are expected to engage in a behavior 
that requires large-scale changes to their environments, such as implementing a local grocery store.  
 While environmental factors can make certain healthy behaviors impossible, they can also 
make them more difficult without them being quite impossible. This raises the question of whether 
it is fair to expect patients to engage in the same healthy behaviors if it is substantially easier for 
some patients to engage in these behaviors than others. For example, returning to the healthy eating 
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example, if one patient lives within walking distance of the only grocery store in town and the 
other patient is a 30-minute bus-ride away, it is substantially easier for the first patient to make the 
time to go to the grocery store to buy the fruits and vegetables necessary for maintaining healthy 
eating habits.  
 Forward-looking personal responsibility seems to have a rather difficult time dealing with 
circumstantial discrepancies. Thus far, our discussion of forward-looking personal responsibility 
has been focused on the perceived likelihood that a patient engages in healthy or unhealthy future 
actions. Forward-looking personal responsibility is worse than even backward-looking personal 
responsibility at discriminating against people who live in environments with negative 
determinants of health, such as a lack of grocery stores. It seems backward-looking personal 
responsibility is simply blind to circumstances that influence actions, given its focus on how past 
actions affect health outcomes. In contrast, one could reasonably infer that forward-looking 
personal responsibility actively punishes victims of circumstantial factors when it calculates the 
likelihood that someone engages in unhealthy post-treatment behaviors. Forward-looking personal 
responsibility does not take into account whether circumstances have affected behaviors; it takes 
into account the fact that circumstances might affect behaviors, which can be utilized to calculate 
the likelihood that someone will engage in unhealthy post-treatment behaviors.  
1.2 Genetic Dispositions 
 Another factor that affects patients’ ability to engage in healthy post-treatment behaviors 
is their genetic code. Research has shown that there are genetic traits that correlate strongly to 
unhealthy behaviors, such as proneness to addiction.59 These factors are once again outside of a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  






persons’ control, and can have a strong impact on the behaviors that are used as the basis for 
distinguishing cases in personal responsibility. As such, forward-looking personal responsibility 
should accommodate for the fact that patients’ who have genetic dispositions to have more 
addictive tendencies will have a harder time changing their unhealthy behaviors. Much like the 
example in the previous section, these patients have a relatively higher degree of difficulty in 
complying with the requirements of forward-looking personal responsibility. As a result, these 
patients could be prioritized substantially lower based on factors that are outside of their control.  
1.3 Responsibility and Other Forms of Inequality 
 A concern that relates directly to the past two sections is whether forward-looking personal 
responsibility, and personal responsibility more generally, can be accused of actively widening the 
gaps between the worst-off and best-off in society. Basing healthcare prioritization on behaviors 
that are directly impacted by these circumstantial factors would result in large numbers of 
marginalized individuals being prioritized lower than the individuals at the top of the social 
hierarchy. This would directly conflict with a Rawlsian theory of justice, a key focal point of 
Daniels’ book, as well as Anderson’s goals of egalitarian justice: to end oppression and promote a 
community of equals.  
 In addition, there is research that has shown that historically marginalized groups can have 
different tendencies in engaging in unhealthy behaviors.60 (McCann 2005) As a result, these groups 
could be considered at higher likelihood of engaging in unhealthy future behaviors, which would 
lower their prioritization in forward-looking personal responsibility. 
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2. Pettit’s Fitness to Be Held Responsible 
 The implications of the previous sections seem quite damaging to the current conception 
of forward-looking personal responsibility. However, there remains hope that this method can be 
edited so as to better accommodate the difficulties discussed in this chapter. I will attempt to 
construct the new version of forward-looking personal responsibility by considering Phillip Pettit’s 
fitness to be held responsible.61 (Pettit, 2007) In this way, the new construction of forward-looking 
personal responsibility will be made in such a way that it better accommodates individuals who 
are victims of uncontrollable circumstantial disadvantages.  
2.1 Pettit’s Conditions of Fitness to Be Held Responsible 
 In Pettit’s Responsibility Incorporated, Pettit is trying to determine the qualifications for 
holding entities such as corporations responsible for their conduct. As such, Pettit defines what 
makes an agent deserving of being held responsible as contingent on three conditions: Value 
relevance, Value judgment, and Value sensitivity.62 Pettit argues that someone who does not have 
all these conditions met is not fit to be held responsible for a given choice.  
 Applying this conception of fitness to be held responsible does significant work for 
answering the concerns raised in the previous sections. This application could be achieved by 
shifting the focus of forward-looking personal responsibility from the likelihood of patients 
engaging in healthy post-treatment behaviors to the likelihood of patients who have the fitness to 
be held responsible for their behaviors engaging in healthy post-treatment behaviors. As a result, 
the new forward-looking personal responsibility model will do a better job of accommodating 
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patients whose circumstances inhibit their fitness to be held responsible. The new conception of 
forward-looking personal responsibility as contingent on fitness to be held responsible will be 
labeled throughout the rest of the paper as forward-looking personal responsibility*. I will now 
attempt to demonstrate the implications of Pettit’s fitness to be held responsible on the forward-
looking personal responsibility* model. Specifically, I will focus on how the forward-looking 
personal responsibility* model refrains from lowering the prioritization of patients based on 
uncontrollable factors.  
2.2 Value relevance 
 Meeting the condition of value relevance implies that the agent is autonomous and faces a 
value-relevant choice. The purpose of this condition is that agents can not be considered fit to be 
held responsible in instances where their actions are considered trivial and non-value relevant. For 
example, in the forward-looking responsibility* model, a patients’ treatment could be contingent 
on them engaging in safe post-treatment behaviors. The condition of value relevance implies that 
actions that do not qualify as safe or unsafe should not warrant blame or praise. For example, if a 
patient is walking down the sidewalk, it is generally not considered an especially safe or especially 
unsafe practice.	  I justify this distinction in the context of the future behaviors a healthcare provider 
would actively support or oppose based on the requirement that the patient be safe in their future 
behaviors. For example, if a patient suffered from a liver problem, the physician would likely not 
make a distinction that walking on the sidewalk is a particularly safe or unsafe practice. In contrast, 
actions such as limiting the amount of alcohol one drinks or engaging in binge drinking would be 
considered safe and unsafe behaviors, respectively. Therefore, if the patient injures the treated 




broke his pre-treatment promise to engage in safe practices since they are not fit to be held 
responsible in cases where their actions were not value relevant.  
2.3 Value judgment 
 Meeting the condition of value judgment requires that the agent understands that her value-
relevant choices would have different impacts, and understands that her decisions can influence 
her fitness to be held responsible. The purpose of this condition is to ensure that the agent 
understands the ramifications of their actions, specifically how different actions will be deserving 
of praise or blame. For the sake of the discussion on forward-looking personal responsibility*, the 
emphasis of this condition parallels Daniels’ requirements for a fair process of limit setting.63 An 
obligation of forward-looking personal responsibility* is to ensure that patients have an accurate 
understanding of how their future actions will affect their prioritization for healthcare treatments. 
This would involve thorough education initiatives to ensure that all people who need limited 
healthcare resources have the potential of being judged on these criteria. In addition, education 
programs should implement values of self-control and will-power so that the condition of value 
judgment can be met in these cases. 
2.4 Value sensitivity 
 Meeting the value sensitivity condition requires that the agent has the necessary control to 
choose between options based on their value-based judgments of the options. This is the condition 
that deals most directly with the objections that were addressed earlier in this chapter. To say that 
an agent has the control to choose between options based on the value-based judgments of the 
options protects both individuals who are forced to make unnecessarily difficult decisions to 
engage in healthy behaviors and those who do not have any access to the necessary resources to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





engage in healthy behaviors.  In this way, both the patient who lives in a city without grocery stores 
and the patient who lives thirty minutes away should not be considered fit to be held responsible 
for their potentially unhealthy eating habits.  
 A potential pitfall of this line of thinking is that there seems to be an arbitrary distinction 
between individuals who make value based judgments when choosing not to pursue an action and 
those that make choices based on other relevant factors. For example, two patients can live the 
same distance away from the closest grocery store, but one has a car and the other does not. What 
is it about the patient-without-the-car’s situation that inhibits them from making a value based 
judgment about the benefits of choosing to walk to the grocery store? The answer seems to depend 
on assessments of people’s means to access the factors necessary to make a value-based judgment. 
While this will not be spelled out in detail here, it is worth considering in further implementations 
of forward-looking personal responsibility*. 
Conclusion 
 As a result of implementing Pettit’s fitness to be held responsible into our account of 
forward-looking personal responsibility*, the model gained an improved ability to accommodate 
individuals who engage in actions as part of uncontrollable factors. This should be a reassuring 
way to demonstrate that forward-looking personal responsibility* does not reinforce social 
hierarchies based on allocations of uncontrollable circumstances.  
 However, it is important at this time to revisit Anderson’s concerns with luck 
egalitarianism, specifically, her concerns that reparations for ‘bad luck’ institute a societal 
inclination to base claims to the less fortunate individuals on pitying their circumstances. The 
intention of this chapter is not to allow for societal discriminations against individuals who are 




looking personal responsibility was the opposite: to ensure that forward-looking responsibility* 
could be better utilized as a tool that creates a society where people are correctly assigned the 
proper level of responsibility they have to engage in healthy post-treatment behaviors.  
 This completes my assessment of the nature of forward-looking personal responsibility* 
and its benefits as a tool in healthcare prioritization. In the conclusion of this paper, I will shift my 
discussion from the nature of forward-looking personal responsibility* to the ways in which 







 The original goal of this project was to demonstrate the benefit of considering forward-
looking personal responsibility in instances of healthcare prioritization. By comparing the 
outcomes of forward-looking personal responsibility with other methods, I was able to demonstrate 
the consequentialist benefits of implementing this model. However, the past chapter demonstrated 
some of the issues involved in applying forward-looking personal responsibility to non-ideal 
scenarios. I will now recommend certain regulations that both healthcare providers and society as 
a whole should implement to ensure that the benefits of forward-looking personal responsibility 
can be applied to the modern healthcare system.  
 Healthcare providers should acknowledge the benefits of implementing forward-looking 
personal responsibility* to deal with instances of scarcity and limit setting. In the United States, 
these can be especially helpful in considerations of organ transplants and other limited health 
resources, such as rooms in a hospital. However, the scope of forward-looking personal 
responsibility* gets larger in less developed countries where considerations of scarcity and limit 
setting are relevant to more health resources, such as vaccinations. Forward-looking personal 
responsibility* could be especially useful for international health groups, such as Doctors Without 
Borders, that provide care in third-world countries. Given the scarce nature of health resources in 
these countries, implementing forward-looking personal responsibility would be a beneficial way 
for these physicians to maximize the likelihood of successful health outcomes, motivate their 
patients to engage in healthy post-treatment behaviors, and strengthen the relationship between 
physicians and their patients.  
 Implementation of forward-looking personal responsibility* prioritization should be a 




system, physicians should emphasize the importance of healthy post-treatment behaviors with their 
patients instead of emphasizing past behaviors. Even if a forward-looking personal responsibility* 
model is not implemented, the positive benefits that have been discussed in this paper demonstrate 
the importance of accountability for future behaviors. Healthcare providers should realize the role 
of motivation in enacting behavioral change and learn the necessary techniques to best motivate 
patients’ willingness to change their behaviors. The goal of this education would be to increase the 
rate that healthcare providers successfully motivate people who are currently engaging in 
unhealthy behaviors to change their behaviors. Formatting the detriments of smoking in the context 
of the future complications that could result from continued smoking, with special emphasis on 
how these complications can inhibit future autonomy and opportunity, should be a successful tool 
for motivating patients to engage in healthier behaviors. The implementation and emphasis on 
teaching healthcare providers how to successfully motivate their patients to engage in healthy post-
treatment behaviors will lead to a healthier society as a whole.  
 The last chapter demonstrated how instances of societal injustice can impact both health 
outcomes and the effectiveness of the forward-looking personal responsibility model to correctly 
determine prioritization of care. To compensate for these injustices, the model was edited to take 
into account fitness to be held responsible. (Pettit 2007) However, a larger social project should 
be negating the impact that social determinants of health have on health outcomes. This can be 
achieved through public health measures that distribute the necessary resources to engage in 
healthy activities, as well as societal programs to grant more people the means necessary to have 
full autonomy over their decisions. While this may seem like a never-ending endeavor, it is 
important that societies dedicate significant resources to ensuring that their citizens’ health needs 




 In the introduction to this paper, I explained that by focusing on positive outcomes, I could 
justify the usefulness of forward-looking personal responsibility as a way to distinguish 
prioritization of healthcare treatments in cases where all other factors were equal. In this way, the 
forward-looking personal responsibility model was a pluralistic model that considered other 
common factors that are utilized to prioritize healthcare allocation: such as urgency, likelihood of 
successful outcomes, and when a claim to care was made. As such, the analysis of this paper 
intended to demonstrate that ignoring forward-looking personal responsibility would be 
detrimental to patient outcomes and utilizing forward-looking personal responsibility would be 
compatible with different conceptions of healthcare. I believe that I was successful in this task. 
Going forward, the implications of this view should be expanded to determine just how influential 
accountability should be in the pluralistic model of healthcare prioritization. In addition, future 
considerations will likely attempt to apply forward-looking personal responsibility to healthcare 
distribution models, not limit its impact to healthcare prioritization. I will make no predictions 
about the success of these attempts. My purpose here was simply to deal with the question, “Should 
forward-looking personal responsibility be considered a relevant factor in determining healthcare 
prioritization,” for which I have concluded, the answer is yes.  



















































Question 3:  
 






Smoker v. Changed Non-Smoker
